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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act created a "complete divorcement"
between commercial and investment banking.' Under this legislation,
commercial banks were prohibited from engaging in the underwriting of
securities.2 In addition, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricted
the ability of bank holding companies to enter into various business arenas
or to purchase other banks.' However, over the years, banks have found
loopholes to expand their business and to avoid such banking regulations.
As the Glass-Steagall Act was diluted by numerous Federal Reserve
Board rulings and bank activities, it became apparent that there was a need
for new legislation.4 Glass-Steagall was out of date, and it was restricting
United States banking institutions here and abroad by limiting commercial
banks and their affiliates from engaging in investment opportunities. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 19991 ("GLB") repealed Glass-Steagall's
Section 20, which banned affiliations between member banks of the
Federal Reserve and firms that were "engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution.. .of stocks, bonds,
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1. Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 221, 223-85 (2000) (citing S. Rep. No. 73-1455, at 185 (1934)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Markham, supra note 1.
5. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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debentures, notes, or other securities," 6 and Section 32, which provided
that "[n]o officer, director, or employee" of a company engaged
principally in underwriting securities could concurrently serve "as an
officer, director, or employee", of a Federal Reserve member bank."
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ratified what had already been
accomplished through legal loopholes. GLB maintains the functional
regulatory system as the basis for regulating the expanded activities of the
banks and their holding company structures. 9 This means that traditional
commercial banking activities would continue to be regulated by the bank
regulators and securities activities would be regulated by the SEC and state
securities commissions. By eliminating prohibitions on affiliations between
commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance companies, GLB
is expected to initiate a new wave of mergers as securities underwriters,
insurers, and banks combine to form more diversified financial services
corporations.
Financial services have become increasingly globalized as of late.' 0
GLB has set the stage not only for a wide array of mergers and
acquisitions domestically, but GLB also provides avenues for foreign banks
to enter the United States financial services market and for United States
financial companies to pursue interests in other countries." However, the
initial enactment of GLB was discriminatory against foreign banks electing
to become financial holding companies in that GLB provided different
standards for foreign and domestic applicants.
Since the enactment of GLB, the Federal Reserve Board has issued an
interim ruling and several amendments to the interim rule that clarify the
process of becoming a financial holding company.,, This article will
examine how these rulings affect German banks. The first section will
describe the German banking system, which is a complex system of
banking institutions and credit cooperatives. The second section will take a
6. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1993) (repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1993) (repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)).
8. Patricia A. McCoy, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, at
http://www.bender.com/bender/open/webdriver?Mlval =chan&channelD =banking (last visited
Aug. 29, 2001).
9. L. Richard Fischer, Financial Services Modernization 2001: Implementation of the
Gramm-Leach-Blilev Act, SF57 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 445 (2001).
10. Id.
11. McCoy, supra note 8.
12. Bank holding companies and change in bank control, 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25,
2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 16302 (Mar. 28, 2000).
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closer look at the Glass-Steagall and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Acts. The third
section will analyze the new regulations established by the Federal
Reserve's interim ruling and amendments of Gramm-Leach Bliley, and
how these rulings pertain to German banks wishing to become financial
holding companies under GLB. This paper will show that the new
regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board will alleviate burdens the
Act placed on German banks by equalizing the playing field between
foreign and domestic entities.
II. STRUCTURE OF GERMAN BANKS
The German banking system varies significantly from that of the
United States in form and permissible activities. It is, therefore, important
to understand the structure of the German banking system before analyzing
how United States laws affect foreign banks.
German banks offer a wide range of financial services, some of which
are prohibited activities in the United States.'3 There is no division
between commercial and investment banking in Germany.14 Thus, the
universal banking system allows banks to own equity in and/or control
commercial, industrial, and insurance companies." As long as non-
banking corporations are deemed "reliable" by the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur
das Kreditwesen (Federal Supervisory Authority), such corporations may
own up to 100 percent of a banking corporation's equity interest. 6
Banks in Germany have taken the role of initiators, advisers, and
financiers of mergers and acquisitions.'7 While all German banks have the
power of universal banking, only a few actually underwrite securities. 'S
Instead, the German banking system is highly segregated. The banking
industry is divided into three major sectors: public sector banks,
cooperative banks, and private banks.19 The Genossenschaftsbanken, or
credit cooperative sector, primarily deals with small business and
13. See generally Helen A. Garten, Universal Banking and Financial Stability, 19 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 159 (1993).
14. Hwa-Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate Governance:
Perspectives From Germany, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371 (1995).
15. Id.
16. Mark E. Nance & Bernd Singhof, Banking's Influence Over Non-Bank Companies
After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1305 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Kim, supra note 14.
19. James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider's Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading in
Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz Deutschland, 19
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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agricultural financing.10 The Geschaftsbanken are private commercial
banks.' Finally, the Sparkassen and Landesbanken, which are public
savings banks, maintain a majority of deposits and dominate the local
market.Y
The group of credit associations, or Genossenschaftsbanken, is
composed of local associations (Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken), their
regional institutions (Zentralbanken), and a central institution (Deutsche
Genossenschaftsbank). 2 The local credit associations are structured in the
form of co-operatives. Banking services under the Genossenschaftsbanken
were initially only accessible to members, who had set up the co-operatives
as "self-made banks" to finance agricultural and industrial undertakings.24
Their business today encompasses all types of financial services and is no
longer limited to members. In regards to branching, the
Genossenschaftsbanken constitute the most widespread banking group in
Germany today, with a market share of approximately twenty-one
percent."
The Geschaftsbanken, or private commercial banks, developed as the
country industrialized in the nineteenth century.26 The lack of an equity
market capable of meeting the financial needs of emerging industrial
enterprises forced Germans to turn to banks for capital. Thus, during the
nineteenth century, banks and industry developed a close relationship.27 In
the twentieth century, these relationships were strengthened in the inter-
war years, when banks were obligated to take stock as protection from
financially troubled companies.28 Following World War II, German capital
markets were once again weakened. The reconstruction of the destroyed
industry heavily depended upon the Marshall Plan, which poured a
significant amount of United States' funds into Germany. 29 After initial
allied plans to divide the large commercial banks into smaller entities were
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Theodore Baums & Michael Gruson, The German Banking Sstem-System of the
Future?, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L 101 (1993).
24. Id.
25. Mance & Singhof, supra note 16, at 1355.
26. Id. at 1356.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1356.
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abandoned, the large commercial banks regained their prominent position
within the German economy?
Currently, the private commercial banks are divided into four
categories. These types consist of big branch banks (GroSSbanken),
regional.banks (Regionalbanken), private bankers (Privatbankiers), and the
branches of foreign banks. Regional banks are organized either as stock
corporations (Aktiengesellschaft-AG) or as limited liability companies
(Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung-GmbH). 1 These regional banks
maintain a nationwide network of branches with a concentration on a
specific region. 2 In contrast, private bankers comprise all banks organized
as partnerships. Nearly all of these private commercial banks function as
universal banks.3   They, therefore, engage in all types of banking
operations. 4 The private commercial banks comprise thirty-five percent of
the commercial bank market share. 3
Sparkassen, or savings banks, are established by cities and
incorporated under state public law.36 Throughout German history,
municipalities and counties considered the opportunity to earn interest on
deposits (of any amount) to be part of their public welfare function. 37 In
order to provide their citizens with this service, counties and cities formed
Sparkassen. Savings banks focus on traditional banking services.38 These
services include the extension of commercial loans and the acceptance of
deposits (that the depositor may withdraw upon demand).3 9 Savings banks'
operations are limited to the locality of the establishing municipality or
district, under what is referred to as Regionalprinzip (or the "territorial
principle").40
30. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16.
31. The so-called "Big Three" (Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, and
Commerzbank AG) have become a party of four after the merger of Bayerische Hypotheken und
Wechselbank and Bayerische Vereinsbank AG into Bayerische HypoVerinsbank. By the end of
2000, it was expected that there would be a party of three again as a result of a proposed merger
between Dresdner Bank AG and Deutsche Bank. Even though this particular merger failed,
other mergers of significance are likely to ensue. Id.
32. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16.
33. Id. at 1357.
34. See generally Garten, supra note 13.
35. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16, at 1357.
36. Id. at 1352.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kim, supra note 14.
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Like the majority of German banks, Landesbanken are universal
banks engaging in both investment banking and commercial banking
functions." In addition, Landesbanken invest in commercial and industrial
ventures.42  Landesbanken are not corporations; instead, they are
established under public law, and their obligations are guaranteed by the
German States.'3
Landesbanken play a vital role in the German banking business and in
the sector of international financial institutions.u One reason for this
position is their close connection with their sponsoring state or political
subdivision of a state."3 Unlike commercial banks organized as entities
under the general corporate law, the internal structure of Landesbanken is
congruous with the requirements of their regulatory supervision."
Landesbanken are at a disadvantage to other German banking institutions
in that it is more difficult for Landesbanken to create new capital. 7
However, Landesbanken provide a unique protection for all customers,
whether as depositors, fund transfer customers, purchasers of securities, or
other types of customers.48 The Landesbanken's lengthy history of more
than 100 years has demonstrated the fortitude of the.public sector banking
organization and has shown that the states and their subdivisions have
benefited from the system of the Landesbanken.'9
The universal banks are valid throughout the European Union
("EU").10 Each member state of the EU recognizes the banking license of
the universal banks, subject to limitations. Since they are not hampered by
restrictions on activities or by geographic limitations, some larger German
banks are actively engaged in United States banking and capital markets.'
Bayerische Landesbank, Westdeutsche Landesbank, and Landedscreditbank
41. Michael Gruson & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken, 1995 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 337 (1995).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Gruson & Schneider, supra note 41, at 355.
46. Id.
47. See Gruson & Schneider, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Peter Q. Noack, West German Bank Secrecy: A Barrier to SEC Insider-Trading
Investigations, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609(1987).
51. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16, at 1353.
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Baden-Wurttemberg have all made public offerings of debt securities in the
United States.2
The EU has encouraged the proliferation of financial services abroad.
As the world's third largest economic power, Germany has sought to
expand its financial strength into other countries, primarily the United
States.53 However, as German financial institutions expand into different
countries, the banks must comply with the laws of the various countries.
1I. REGULATIONS ON UNITED STATES BANKING
Following the United States stock market crash of 1929, the Glass-
Steagall Act was enacted.- Since it was thought that banks' involvement in
the stock market was a contributing factor to the crash, the Act sought to
divide commercial banking and investment banking in the United States. 5
By prohibiting banks from underwriting securities, the federal government
sought to protect investors' The law also prohibited affiliates of banks
from being principally engaged in underwriting securities, and banned
banks and securities finms from sharing board members and directors. 57
The United States entered into its worst depression after the stock
market crash of "Black Thursday" on Wall Street, October 24, 1929.
With more than 11,000 commercial bank failures from 1930 to 1933, the
number of functioning commercial banks was reduced by more than forty
percent from 25,000 to 14,000.11 A quarter of the working population
became unemployed by 1933.- 9 Under the newly elected Roosevelt
administration, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, which
prohibited commercial banks from engaging in securities transactions (the
principal exception being that commercial banks were allowed to
underwrite most government-issued bonds).6 It was the prevailing belief
that the cause for these bank failures and the stock market crash was the
involvement of banks in securities transactions. 6'
52. Id.
53. Freis, supra note 19.
54. Markham, supra note 1.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
25 J. CORP. L. 691 (2000).
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994).
61. Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
579 (2000).
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Populist sentiment, not careful inquiry, encouraged the passage of the
Glass-Steagall Act." In light of disclosures of disreputable practices and
dishonest dealings with such banks as National City Bank, public mistrust
of speculative securities dealings carried over into commercial banking.
This hastened the enactment of the Glass-Steagall regulatory measures.63
Some historians now attribute the bank failures to the Depression itself,
which caused real estate and other values to fall, thus undermining bank
loans." Furthermore, these historians note that securities abuses played a
minor role in the collapse of banks. There were few failures among the
New York banks, which had the largest Wall Street operations. 61 Actually,
the legislative history to the Glass-Steagall Act does not indicate that
Congress blamed banks or their securities for the onset of the Great
Depression, but instead, shows congressional concern with the relationship
between commercial banks and their subsidiaries that underwrote
securities, and the ability of the banks, through their subsidiaries, to
dominate corporate underwriting."
Since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks and other financial
service industries gradually chipped away at the restrictions between
commercial and investment banking.7 The banking industry pressed for
almost two decades for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and for changes
to the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA")." Regulatory interpretation,
cross-industry relationships, court rulings, and marketplace practices had
an impact on the practicality of these two statutes, but no legislative action
was taken. 69
The business of traditional banking and investment banking had
converged prior to enactment of GLB.7°  In addition, banks were
significantly involved in the insurance business through such sources of
authority as "the place of 5000" exception to Section 92 of the National
62. Markham, supra note 1, at 237.
63. See Macey, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. Laura J. Cox, The Impact of Citicorp-Travelers Group Merger on Financial
Modernization and the Repeal of Glass-Steagall, 23 NOVA L. REV. 899, 902 (1999) (citing
Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 57 (1987)).
66. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The "Great Fall:" The Consequences of Repealing the Glass-
Steagall Act, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 129, 138 (1995) (citing 75 Cong. Rec. 9887 (1933) and
75 Cong. Rec. 9904 (1933)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61.
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Banking Act ("NBA")," and Section 24 (Seventh) of the NBA, providing
that national banks may engage in the business of banking and "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking." ' 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson" held that state legislation could not restrict national
banks from selling insurance.
Likewise, insurance companies started to sell securities-e.g.,
products such as variable annuities-and found ways to bypass restrictions
of the BHCA, which prohibited mixing of banking and nonbanking
activities." Some strategies to achieve this consisted of owning a thrift
subsidiary," a "nonbank" bank,' 6 and operating a limited purpose trust."
United States Senator Gramm of Texas, in a November 3, 1999 floor
statement, summarized this evolution:
This bill we bring to the floor of the Senate basically
knocks down the barriers in American law that separate
banking from insurance and banking from securities, These
walls, over time, because of innovative regulators and
because of the pressure of the market system, have come
71. The National Bank Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 752, 753-54 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 92
(1994)), permits a national bank located in a place with a population of less than five thousand
people to act as an insurance agent. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that this
statute was still on the books. See United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins.
Agents ofAmer., 508 U.S. 439, 463 (1993).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994). See also NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (holding that the sale of annuities by national banks to their
customers was "incidental" to "the business of banking" under the National Bank Act. Variable
annuities were held to be financial products).
73. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
74. The variable annuity was held to be a security by the Supreme Court. See SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959). Annuity premiums were
invested in securities, and therefore the performance of such investments determined the income
of the variable annuity, a product sold to compete with mutual funds.
75. The Savings and Loan Holding Company Act (Codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1730A (1994))
provided that a company owning a single thrift institution, with sixty-five percent or more of its
assets devoted to housing or consumer-related lending, was not restricted to any restrictions on
other activities undertaken by the company. GLB closes this loophole.
76. A nonbank bank is an institution that failed to meet the BHCA's defimition of a bank,
which is an institution that both accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. The
Competitive Equality Bank Act of 1987 closed this loophole, but grandfathered nonbank banks
existing as of March 5,1987. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (c)(A) (1994) (defining "bank" under the
BHCA).
77. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D) (1994). A trust company is not considered a bank
under the BHCA if functioning "solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity," accepting only trust
funds deposits (as opposed to demand deposits) and does not offer FDIC insurance.
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to look like very thin slices of Swiss cheese. As a result,
we already have substantial competition occurring, but it is
competition that is largely inefficient and costly, it is
unstable, and it is not in the public interest for this
situation to continue.7'
The convergence, which took place between banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms, and the trend toward consolidation of
these industries to create "one-stop-shop" financial centers, is best
illustrated by the 1998 merger of two large United States banks, Citicorp
and Travelers, into the conglomerate, Citigroup. 79 The Federal Reserve
Board ("FRB") approval of the merger was subject to the divestiture of the
Travelers' insurance underwriting business.80 Under the BHCA, the
divestiture period for non-conforming assets is two years by statute, with
the FRB allowed to grant three additional one-year extensions."1
Obviously, Citigroup was counting on Congress to change the laws before
the expiration of the divestiture deadline.82
In passing GLB, Congress gave formal recognition of the many
changes that had already occurred in the marketplace during the prior two
decades.'3 Senator Rod Grams of Minnesota acknowledged that the world
envisioned by GLB already existed at the time of enactment, stating that
"many times Congress shows up at the dance after the music is over."'4
However, attempts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act began almost as
soon it was passed." The most vocal proponent of its repeal was,
ironically, one of the bill's authors, Senator Carter Glass. Only two years
after the Glass-Steagall Act was adopted, Glass believed it was a "mistake
and overreaction."86 However, the more frequent and serious reform
attempts were made in the 1980s and 1990s. The last unsuccessful attempt
78. Steve Cocheo, The "Big One" Becomes Law; S.900: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
ABA BANKING J. (1999).
79. Cox, supra note 65, at 902.
80. Id.
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1994).
82. See Cox, supra note 65.
83. Cocheo, supra note 78, at 6.
84. See Douglas P. Faucette, The Impact of Converge and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on
the Insurance Industry, 8 GEo. MASON. L. REv. 623, 629 (2000) (citing Dean Anason, Senate
Passes Reform Bill, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1).
85. Id.
86. See Rep. James A. Leach, Modernization of Financial Institutions, 25 IOWA J. CORP.
LAW 681, 683 (2000) (citing Robert Litan, It's Alive, Why Glass-Steagall, Reviled for Decades,
Just Won't Go Away, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at A6).
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was in 1998, with the proposed Financial Services Competitiveness Act of
1997. H.R. 10, introduced in the 105th Congress, would have repealed
Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, thus allowing affiliations
among banks, securities firms, and insurance firms through financial
holding companies to be regulated by the FRB.10 The proposed Act would
also have created a new entity, the Wholesale Financial Institution, which
would not accept deposits of less than $100,000, and would not be
federally insured.w The White House opposed elements of H.R. 10,
because it would have shifted some regulatory duties from the Department
of the Treasury to the FRB. The bill was approved by the full House of
Representatives on May 13, 1998 by one vote, but failed to reach a Senate
vote, due to Senator Gramm's opposition to the CRA provisions in the
bill.9
Building on the activity that took place during 1997 and 1998, early
legislation action followed in the 106th Congress. In the House of
Representatives, Representative James Leach, Chairman of the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, introduced on January 6,
1999, H.R. 10, the "Financial Services Act of 1999."90 On March 4,
1999, the Senate Banking Committee, under the Chairmanship of Senator
Phil Gramm, revised a Committee Print that was then introduced as
S.900, the "Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999."91
On March 23, the House Committee on Banking and Financial
Services approved H.R. 10, which was then sequentially referred to the
House Commerce Committee.9 In the meantime, on April 28, 1999, the
Senate Banking Committee formally filed S.900, Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, in the Senate.9 On May 6, 1999, the Senate
passed an amended version of S.900, by a vote of 54-44. The House
Committee on Commerce, under Chairman Thomas Bliley, reported its
own version of H.R. 10 on June 15, 1999." Subsequently, the House
Rules Committee resolved differences between the two versions of H.R.
10 and sent it to the House of Representatives, which passed the bill on
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).
91. Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999, Report of the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, to accompany S.900 together with Additional
Views, S. Rep No. 106-44 (2000).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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July 1, 1999 by a vote of 343-86." H.R. 10 and S.900 then went to
conference under bill number S.900.96
On August 3, 1999, the Conference Committee held its first meeting,
chaired by the Chairman of the House Banking Committee, Representative
James Leach (Republican, Iowa)."' On October 12, 1999, Chairman
Gramm, Leach, and Bliley released a "Chairmen's Mark," which became
the document from which the conference committee would work." On
October 14, 1999, the Department of Treasury and the FRB reached a
compromise over their corresponding supervisory roles."' On October 22,
1999, the conference committee held a final meeting. A compromise was
reached on CRA, and the bill was named the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
The Conference Report,19' together with the Statement of Managers
Summary of Major Provisions dated November 1, 1999, was approved
and signed by majority of conferees on November 2, 1999. °10 On
November 4, 1999, the Senate approved the Conference Report on S.900,
by a vote of 90-8.102 The House of Representatives followed within hours
by a vote of 362-57.9' On November 12, 1999, the President signed the
bill into law.'°GLB repeals Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 10 Section
20 prohibited member banks from affiliating with a company "engaged
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution
at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities."'9' The Act also repealed Section
32 of Glass-Steagall which provided that "no officer, director or
employee" of a firm principally engaged in underwriting securities may
serve "as an officer, director, or employee" of a member bank of the
95. Id.
96. Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999, supra note 91.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. H.R. CONF REP. No 106-434 (1999).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. GLB did not affect Sections 16 or 21 of Glass-Steagall.
106. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
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Federal Reserve."" This provision allows for the interlocking of various
boards of banks and securities firms. ,06
The Bank Holding Company Act prohibited bank holding companies
from "providing insurance as a principal, agent, or broker."'1' GLB's
reversal of that restriction cleared the path for financial holding companies
to own insurance companies.1"° Under GLB, a company that wishes to
participate in such industries must apply with the FRB to attain a financial
holding company status.", This new type of bank holding company,
known as a financial holding company, may engage in expanded financial
activities, either directly or via subsidiaries." 2 A bank holding company
that is not a financial holding company will be restricted in its activities to
those that were previously determined to be closely related to banking."
To that effect, Section 102 of GLB amends Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, allowing a bank holding company to control
"shares of any company the activities of which had been determined by
the Board by regulation or order under this paragraph ... to be so closely
related to banking as to be proper incident thereto . . . .""i Only banks
that are "well capitalized" and "well managed" may elect to become a
financial holding company. GLB also establishes the FRB as the
"umbrella regulator. ""i
GLB modernizes the delivery of financial services to consumers,
allowing the financial industry to cross-market services among affiliates
and third parties."6 The elimination of legal barriers to affiliations among
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies will facilitate "one-stop
shopping" consumer offerings for banking, insurance, and securities
107. Id.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1994).
110. Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
115. See generally Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61. Under the umbrella regulator
structure, the Federal Reserve Board will regulate financial holding companies and their
activities. Antitrust agencies such as the Department of Justice, Office of the Comptroller of
Currency, Federal Trade Commission, the Fed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
retain the authority to review mergers and acquisitions. Other agencies-i.e., the SEC and state
insurance regulators-will continue to functionally regulate securities and insurance activities.
See generally id.
116. See id.
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transactions."' Greater competition and a more efficient financial service
system should result in substantial savings to the consumer. 8  Also, GLB
should increase the international competitiveness of American financial
firms. "9
GLB provides flexibility in structuring these affiliations and addresses
how these structures will be regulated, including safeguards against
adverse consequences from consolidation. '2 By allowing most activities
"financial in nature" 2' to be conducted by either a holding company or a
bank's financial subsidiary, GLB provides financial organizations with
flexibility in structuring these new activities. Although the FRB's role of
umbrella supervisor is maintained, GLB provides for functional
regulation, thus utilizing the strengths of the various federal and state
regulators.'2 How this will develop remains unclear: with banking,
insurance, and securities products becoming increasingly similar, a
rationalization of the regulatory structure may be revisited by Congress in
the future.,2
GLB provides for safeguards designed to mitigate adverse
consequences from consolidation within the financial industry, such as
117. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
25 J. CORP. L. 691 (2000).
118. Id.
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121. Activities that are "financial in nature" include:
underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities; insuring, guaranteeing, or
indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing and
issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for purposes of such
insurance, in any state; lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or
safeguarding money or securities; issuing or selling instruments representing interests
in pools of assets permissible for a bank to hold directly; providing financial,
investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an investment company;
all activities the Board determined were closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto as of November 12, 1999;
engaging in all activities that traditional bank holding companies may engage in outside
of the United States; engaging in all activities that the Board determined were "usual in
connection with the transaction of banking or other financial operations abroad" as to
November 11, 1999; engaging in merchant banking by directly or indirectly owning
securities acquired and held by a securities affiliate, an investment adviser affiliate or
an insurance underwriting affiliate as part of a bona fide underwriting or merchant or
investment banking activity; and directly or indirectly owning securities as an
investment made in the ordinary course of business as an insurance underwriter.
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requiring a bank holding company seeking financial holding company
status to be "well capitalized" and "well managed."'1' Another provision
calls for a study to prevent the possible damage that would arise from the
failure of a "too big to fail" institution. '12
GLB also provides for various consumer protection provisions, such
as privacy of personal information and ATM fees disclosure.' 2 A
minimum federal standard of financial privacy has also been established. '11
However, as information sharing among affiliates is not subject to the new
rules, the financial industry is not seriously affected in its ability to cross-
market services among affiliates and third parties.' More legislation on
privacy can be expected, such as on the sharing of medical information
that financial conglomerates may possess through their insurance
subsidiaries. 29  Major consumer protection provisions also include
disclosure of surcharges on ATMs and consumer protection rules for
insurance practices together with disclosure and advertisement
requirements, including anti-tying provisions. 11o
GLB maintains international supervisory standards established by the
Basle Committee, which states that the holding company of a bank
organization with multinational operations must be supervised by the home
country of that bank.'3' However, subsidiaries must register with the FRB
as a "representative office." 32 Foreign banks that do not maintain an
American office may still be subject to United States banking
supervision. 133 Foreign-owned United States broker-dealer and investment
managers may be required to register with the FRB.1'4 Also, a foreign
banking organization that operates a branch or agency, or that owns or
controls a bank or commercial lending company in the United States, is
subject to the limits applicable to domestic bank holding companies and
124. Id.
125. Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61.
126. Steve Bartlett, Conswners Reap Benefits When Financial Firms Integrate Information,
5 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 8 (2001).
127. Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61.
128. L. Richard Fischer, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Its Implementation, A.L.I.-
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financial holding companies.- Therefore, the FRB applies domestic
requirements of capital management and activities to foreign banks that
operate branches in the United States. '11
IV. NEW REGULATIONS
The regulations instituted since GLB significantly affect foreign banks
that operate in the United States.' In January 2000, the FRB issued an
interim rule that:
sets forth the procedures by which bank holding companies
and foreign banks may submit to the Board an election to
become a financial holding company and describes the
period in which the Board will act on financial holding
company elections. [The rule] also enumerates the criteria
that bank holding companies and foreign banks must meet
in order to qualify as a financial holding company. In
addition, the newly added sections set forth the limitations
that the Board will apply to financial holding companies
that fail to maintain compliance with applicable capital,
management, and CRA criteria. 's
In order to make the treatment of elections by foreign banks equal to
those elections filed by domestic bank holding companies, the interim rule
was amended to allow elections filed by foreign banks that meet the "well
managed" and "well capitalized" provisions of the Act to become effective
on the thirty-first day after filing, unless the Board finds the election
unsatisfactory or the foreign bank agrees to extend the review period. 3 9 In
addition, the Board amended the interim rule to require that all domestic
depository institution subsidiaries (such as thrifts and nonbank trust
companies) of electing foreign banks be "well capitalized" and "well
managed" and have satisfactory or better composite and Community
Reinvestment Act ratings. 14 This provision makes the requirements for
foreign banks consistent with the requirements imposed on domestic bank
holding companies. 1 Finally, the Board amended the interim rule to deal
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
138. Id.
139. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
140. Id.
141. Id.
2002S
with banks that are chartered in countries where there is no comprehensive
consolidated supervision determiner." 2 Banks in such a situation should
use the pre-clearance process provided by the interim rule if such a bank is
considering making a financial holding company election."3
The first amendment is intended to equalize the processing of
elections filed by foreign banks and the processing of elections filed by
domestic bank holding companies.I" Under the provisions of the interim
rule as issued on January 19, 2000, an application to attain financial
holding company status by a foreign bank or company is not effective until
the Board makes an affirmative finding that the foreign bank meets specific
capital and management standards.""
However, a domestic bank holding company's election for financial
holding company status is effective within thirty-one days of its filing
unless the Board determines otherwise. '"4 Therefore, when a foreign bank
applied to the FRB to obtain financial holding company status, the foreign
bank was at the mercy of the FRB."7 The FRB had no time limitations on
its review of the foreign bank.'14 New regulations, however, impose a
thirty-one-day time limit in which the FRB must determine whether the
foreign bank is adequately capitalized and managed to be a financial
holding company." 9
Under the amendment, the Board retains the authority to declare the
election ineffective because of inadequate capital in comparison to the
capital required for a domestic bank owned by a financial holding
company.' ° The rule was also amended to allow the Board to find an
election ineffective if the Board does not have sufficient information to
assess whether the foreign bank meets the criteria of a financial holding
company.'' These changes ensure that qualified foreign banks will receive
equal treatment as similarly situated domestic bank holding companies. If
a foreign bank does not meet the rule's specified requirements, it may file
a pre-clearance request for a specific determination on the comparability of
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
145. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
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its capital and management.' This pre-clearance request means that the
FRB will return an assessment of what areas of the company's capital and
management do not meet the requirements needed to become a financial
holding company.3
The second amendment clarifies the interim rule with respect to
foreign banks that do not have a United States subsidiary bank, but may
have other United States depository institution subsidiaries, such as thrifts
and nonbank trust companies.'" The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires
that, in order for a bank holding company to be eligible to become a
financial holding company, all depository institutions controlled by the
bank holding company must be "well capitalized" and "well managed."Im
The interim rule required only that a foreign bank and each of its United
States branches, agencies, and commercial lending subsidiaries be well
capitalized and well managed in order for the foreign bank to be eligible as
a financial holding company.'1 In order to make the requirements for
foreign banks consistent with the requirements imposed on bank holding
companies, the interim rule was amended to mandate that all domestic
depository institution subsidiaries of the foreign bank must be "well
capitalized" and "well managed" for the foreign bank to qualify as a
financial holding company. ' As a result, the rule was also amended to
require that the foreign bank certify that its United States depository
institution subsidiaries are "well capitalized" and "well managed." .
A bank is deemed to be "well capitalized" if:
(1)(i) its home country supervisor, as defined in §211.21
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21), has adopted
risk-based capital standards consistent with the Capital
Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(Basel Accord);
(ii) the foreign bank maintains a Tier 1 capital to total
risk-based assets ratio of six percent and a total capital to
total risk-based assets ratio of ten percent, as calculated
under its home country standard;
152.65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
157. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
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(iii) the foreign bank maintains a Tier 1 capital to total
assets leverage ratio of at least three percent; and
(iv) the foreign bank's capital is comparable to the
capital required for a United States bank owned by a
financial holding company; or
(2) the foreign bank has obtained a determination from
the Board under § 225.91(c) that the foreign bank's capital
is otherwise comparable to the capital that would be
required of a United States bank owned by a financial
holding company.
(c) standards for "well managed." A foreign bank will
be considered "well managed" if: Each of the United
States branches, agencies, and commercial lending
subsidiaries of the foreign bank has received at least a
satisfactory composite rating at its most recent assessment;
(2) the home country supervisor of the foreign bank
considers the overall operations of the foreign bank to be
satisfactory or better; and
(3) the management of the foreign bank meets
standards comparable to those required of a United States
bank owned by a financial holding company." 9
A bank is "well managed" if:
(i) at its most recent inspection or examination or
subsequent review by the appropriate Federal banking
agency for the depository institution, the institution
received:
(A) at least a satisfactory composite rating; and
(B) at least a satisfactory rating for management; or
(ii) in the case of a depository institution that has not
received an examination rating, the Board has determined,
after a review of managerial and other resources of the
159. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 25, 2000).
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depository institution and after consulting the appropriate
Federal banking agency for the institution, that the
institution is well managed. 160
The third amendment to the interim rule relates to the review of
comprehensive consolidated supervision ("CCS") in connection with
elections by foreign banks to become a financial holding company.'16
Home country supervision is an important factor in the determination of
whether a bank is "well managed."'6 Most foreign banks that elect to be
treated as financial holding companies will be subject to comprehensive
consolidated supervision. 16,
The interim rule allows a foreign bank or company to request a
review of its qualifications prior to formally filing its election to become a
financial holding company.'TM In order to assist the Board's review of
whether the management of a foreign bank meets the appropriate
standards, the interim rule was amended. It encourages foreign banks that
have not been reviewed by the Board with respect to home country
supervision and that are chartered in countries where no other bank from
that country has received a CCS determination from the Board (including a
determination that the home country supervisor is actively working toward
a system of CCS) to use the pre-clearance process if such bank is
considering making an election to be treated as a financial holding
company. 6 5
The amendment to the interim rule regarding bank holding companies
is a revision of the definition of "well managed" applicable to a depository
institution for purposes of determining qualification as a financial holding
company under the Grann-Leach-Bliley Act.'6 6 For this purpose, the
Board initially adopted the existing Regulation Y definition of "well
managed."' 67 The Board's definition requires that a depository institution
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
165. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
166. Id.
167. (c) Well managed--(1) In general. For purposes of this subpart, a depository institution
is well managed if:
(i) at its most recent inspection or examination or subsequent review by the appropriate
Federal banking agency for the depository institution, the institution received:
(A) at least a satisfactory composite rating; and
(B) at least a satisfactory rating for management; or
Smith
have at least a satisfactory composite examination rating and at least a
satisfactory rating for both management and compliance. '6 This three-part
definition was initially adopted by the Board as part of its effort to
determine whether a bank holding company qualifies for expedited
treatment in applications processing. '6
Therefore, a bank holding company qualifies for expedited processing
if eighty percent of the depository institution assets of the company were
"well managed."170 In order to become and remain a financial holding
company under the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act, all of the depository
institution assets of a bank holding company must be "well managed. "7
The Granmm-Leach-Bliley Act does not address compliance ratings in
determining whether an institution is "well managed." Accordingly, the
Board is amending its regulatory definition of "well managed" for
purposes of determining qualification as a financial holding company to
reflect the two-part test in the statute.'n Thus, a depository institution will
be considered "well managed" for this purpose if it has a satisfactory
composite rating and a satisfactory rating for management.' 3
The Board continues to believe that compliance ratings are important
and will address issues relating to compliance in other contexts. In
particular, the Board and other federal banking agencies have supervisory
authority to take full action against an institution if compliance issues are
raised. 17 In addition, each agency may consider compliance ratings when
determining whether to approve any merger or expansion proposal
involving the depository institution or the parent bank holding company of
the institution.'"7
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows financial holding companies in
the United States to conduct banking, investment and insurance business
(ii) in the case of a depository institution that has not received an examination rating,
the Board has determined, after a review of managerial and other resources of the
depository institution and after consulting the appropriate Federal banking agency for
the institution, that the institution is well managed.
Id.
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through separate subsidiaries.16  This is a step toward the universal
banking system already in existence in Germany. However, these steps
imposed more rigid capital and management standards for foreign banks
with United States branches thus having a discriminatory effect on foreign
banks. In the final implementing regulations, the FRB relaxed the
requirements for foreign banks. As a result, it will be easier for German
banks to obtain and preserve United States financial holding company
status.
The new regulations will make it easier for foreign banks to enter the
United States market. Not only do the regulations level the playing field
between domestic and foreign banks, by applying the same standards and
time limits, but they also clarify the process for becoming a financial
holding company.
The first amendment to the interim ruling will eliminate the
discriminatory effect that GLB had against the election of German financial
service institutions to become financial holding company in the United
States. By applying the same time period in which the Federal Reserve
Board must decide whether or not an election for fimancial holding
company status is effective, domestic financial service companies and
foreign financial service companies have the same opportunity to gain the
perks of being a financial holding company. Prior to the amendment, a
German bank would have to wait until the FRB assessed its election,
without any given time schedule. Now, German banks will be afforded the
same thirty-one-day period as any domestic bank would receive.
The second and third amendments will continue to tear down barriers
that GLB instituted by clarifying the election procedures for foreign
companies. The original standards for becoming a financial holding
company in GLB were vague and difficult for German banks to be in
compliance. These new criteria apply the same tests to domestic applicants
as well as foreign companies. As such, German banks will be on equal
footing with United States banks.
V. CONCLUSION
The new regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board will
alleviate the discriminatory effect that Gramm-Leach-Bliley had on
German banks operating in the United States. By equalizing the playing
field, both domestic banks and foreign banks will have the same
opportunities regarding the election of becoming a financial holding
company.
176. McCoy, supra note 8.
